Covert Arms and the Politics of Ambiguity

This book investigates how covert arms programs persist when states develop nuclear capabilities while publicly denying such efforts, a pattern illustrated by clandestine programs in the Middle East and South Asia. By treating hidden nuclear activity not as isolated deception but as a disruption to non-proliferation norms, the analysis examines the concealed mechanics of information flow, decision-making hierarchies, and incentive structures that allow governments to pursue weapons development while maintaining a public image of peaceful intent. The first mechanism concerns the controlled flow of sensitive information within scientific and military institutions. Compartmentalization restricts knowledge to a small inner circle, reducing leak risks while limiting broader institutional oversight. This separation allows technical progress to continue even as diplomatic channels publicly reinforce commitments to peaceful nuclear development. The second mechanism involves hierarchical approval systems in which senior leaders authorize covert programs to pursue deterrence, regional influence, or strategic leverage while subordinate networks implement operations under strict secrecy protocols. Once approved, these chains of execution can operate with limited external scrutiny, reducing the likelihood of detection before capabilities mature. The third mechanism examines incentive structures shaped by security dilemmas and geopolitical competition. Leaders may calculate that the strategic advantages of a concealed nuclear capability outweigh the risks of future exposure, particularly when verification systems remain incomplete or unreliable. This logic encourages investment in hidden facilities, dual-use technologies, and covert procurement networks despite long-term diplomatic and legitimacy costs.